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Abstract
We study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals (sellers) af-
fects market participation by a privately-informed agent (consumer). When participation
is restricted to all-or-nothing (“intrinsic” agency), the agent must choose between both
principals’ contracts and selecting her outside option. When the agent is afforded the
additional possibilities of choosing only one contract (“delegated” agency), competition
is more intense. The two games have distinct predictions for participation. Intrinsic
agency always induces more distortion in participation relative to the monopoly outcome
and equilibrium allocations are discontinuous for the marginal consumer. Under dele-
gated agency, relative to monopoly market participation increases (resp. decreases) when
contracting variables are substitutes (resp. complements) on the intensive margin. Equi-
librium allocations are continuous for the marginal consumer and the range of product
offerings is identical to both the first-best and the monopoly outcome.
Keywords: Common Agency, Nonlinear Pricing, Market Participation.
JEL Classification : D82
∗We are grateful to Wouter Dessein, Bruno Jullien, Jakub Kastl, Salvatore Piccolo, Jerome Pouyet, Canice
Prendergast, Shan Zhao and seminar participants from the Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Duke, New
York University, Rochester, Stanford University, University of Calgary and the University of Alberta for helpful
comments and discussions. We thank Igal Hendel and two referees for their insightful comments. All errors are
ours.
†Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI-GREMAQ and EHESS), France. e-mail: martimor@cict.fr
‡University of Chicago, GSB, USA. email: lars.stole@gsb.uchicago.edu.
1 Introduction
This paper studies common agency games between competing principals using screen-
ing contracts targeted at a distribution of privately informed agents. Many interesting
economic applications fit into such a setting. For example, when two non-cooperating
regulatory bodies regulate the same privately-informed firm but on different dimensions
(e.g., output and pollution), the outcome can be modeled as an equilibrium to a common
agency game. As a second example, when two firms sell non-homogenous goods to the
same consumer using nonlinear pricing as a price discrimination strategy, the price sched-
ules which arise can also be modeled as an equilibrium to a common agency game. There
is a critical difference between these two examples which is the subject of this paper.
In the first example, the regulated firm does not have a choice to be regulated by only
one regulator; that is, the firm can choose to leave the industry and face no regulation,
or it can choose to abide by both sets of regulations. Here, common agency and non-
participation are the only potential outcomes and therefore common agency is intrinsic
to the game. In the second example it is natural to allow the consumer the option of
purchasing exclusively from one firm, and so common agency is no longer intrinsic to the
game but a choice variable that is delegated to the agent. In this paper, we explore both
the intrinsic and delegated variations of common agency games. We are especially inter-
ested in how these variations impact the familiar misallocations that arise in monopoly
screening settings and, in particular, the distortions on the external participation margin.
Early efforts by Martimort (1992, 1996) and Stole (1991), as well as most subsequent
applications of common agency with asymmetric information to date, have been in the
context of intrinsic1 common agency games – games in the form of our regulation exam-
ple.2 In the canonical form of this common agency game, an agent learns some private
preference parameter regarding the margins of two economic activities, say q1 and q2.
Both principals simultaneously and non-cooperatively offer selection contracts with the
restriction that principal i’s contract cannot depend upon activity qj , j "= i. Hence, the
contracting variables are private rather than public. Following the offers, the agent must
decide between accepting or rejecting both contracts; the agent is not allowed to accept one
contract and reject the other. Activities are subsequently chosen and payoffs are awarded
in accord with the activities and the contracts. Such a modeling is naturally appropriate
1Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) coined the expressions of intrinsic and delegated common agency.
2See Mezzetti (1997), Laffont and Tirole (1993, ch. 17), Bond and Gresik (1997), Ivaldi and Martimort
(1994), Olsen and Torsvik (1993, 1995) and Olsen and Osmudsen (2001), among others.
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when the agent is a regulated firm and the principals are distinct regulatory bodies, each
with authority over a mutually exclusive set of activities. A firm may decide to exit the
industry (i.e., “reject” the regulatory contracts), but the firm can never decide to accept
one set of regulations and reject the other.
The delegated common agency game that allows the agent the extra options of ac-
cepting a subset of the principals’ contract offers has received far less attention than its
intrinsic counterpart.3 The value of exclusivity for the agent, however, depends upon the
agent’s private information and, as a consequence, delegated agency games require the
imposition of type-dependent participation constraints.4
To the best of our knowledge, no one has studied the economic consequences of com-
mon agency (both intrinsic and delegated) on distortions in contractual activities and
participation. In our early papers, Martimort (1992) and Stole (1991), we studied the
equilibrium outcomes of the intrinsic agency game under the assumption of full participa-
tion and argued that the analysis also applies to the case of delegation when contracting
activities are complements. Moreover, when the activities are substitutes, the economics
of the intrinsic agency distortions still provide considerable insight into the marginal dis-
tortions in delegated agency games. One has to pay closer attention to the agent’s rents
and participation constraints, however, when common agency is delegated. Calzolari and
Scarpa (2004) explored non-intrinsic common agency and proved that the agent obtains
greater rents in a non-intrinsic game but that otherwise the productive allocations are
identical. This conclusion relies, however, on the assumption of full participation. When
the market is not covered, as we show below, the participation distortions typically de-
pend upon whether the common agency game is delegated or intrinsic. The primary
contribution of the present paper is to provide an analysis of the two forms of distortions
– intensive margins (activity levels) and extensive margins (participation) – and to relate
the directions and magnitudes of these distortions to the underlying game form and the
preferences of the agent.
Our paper also contributes to an understanding of the interactions between competi-
tion and price discrimination. Because theoretical work in multi-principal contract games
has largely restricted attention to intrinsic settings, it has remained unclear how compe-
3Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) develops this concept in common agency games under complete informa-
tion.
4Laussel and Lebreton (2001) have shown that delegated common agency may lead to outcomes where the
agent gets a positive rent even under complete information if the number of principals is greater than two. Our
focus on asymmetric information and two principals can thus be seen as complementary to theirs.
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tition affects the character of nonlinear pricing between duopolists.5 In addition, most
competitive nonlinear pricing applications have assumed one-stop-shopping or exclusive-
purchasing in which the consumer may buy from only one firm in equilibrium, thereby
incorporating all competitive pressures in the outside option.6 Other papers that have al-
lowed for purchasing from multiple vendors in equilibrium have also restricted preferences
such that full coverage arises in equilibrium.7 The present paper allows for multiple ven-
dors and exclusivity. It also allows for less-than-full coverage. In this sense, our results
indicate which intuitions from nonlinear pricing are robust with respect to incomplete
market coverage and the possibility of purchasing from both firms as well as just one.
Section 2 begins with a stylized example using unit demands in which only participa-
tion (extensive) distortions can arise; intensive distortions on consumption are assumed
away. This allows us to focus on the relationship between the participation distortion and
the nature of consumer preferences and provides a simple intuition that underlies much of
the analysis which follows. Section 3 describes our more general multi-principal contract-
ing games. While the application of our results is quite general to multi-principal games,
for concreteness, we focus on the competitive setting between two firms (the principals)
selling to a possibly common consumer (the agent) using nonlinear pricing.
In Section 4, we present a methodology for solving multi-principal games whenever
preferences satisfy a set of practical regularity conditions. In the case of a single firm
selling both product lines (the monopoly benchmark), these regularity conditions are eas-
ily satisfied for a range of preferences. In the case of multi-principal games, however,
our approach is to construct an indirect utility function from a hypothetical equilibrium
price schedule to study best responses. Because the preference construction is endoge-
nous, regularity can not be imposed exogenously, but must be verified in the candidate
equilibrium. This endogeneity is the unique source of technical complexities inherent in
multi-principal screening games. We discuss these issues at some length, so this section
should be of independent interest to those studying multiprincipal incentives contract-
ing.8 In this paper, we take the approach of assuming that the equilibria under study
are regular, thereby simplifying the proofs and highlighting the economic content of the
5Stole (2007) provides a survey of the literature on price discrimination in competitive environments.
6Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002), for example.
7For example, Ivaldi and Martimort (1994).
8These techniques for solving multiprincipal screening games are evoked or presented in parts in a few papers
(see, for instance, Martimort and Stole (2003), Martimort (2007) and Stole (2007)). No single paper, however,
has provided a self-contained treatment of the approach in the completeness that we undertake here.
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results, and leaving the verification of regularity to settings with additional structure on
preferences. In particular, we will show that when preferences are quadratic and types
are uniformly distributed, regular equilibria always exist.
We turn to the study of delegated games in Section 5 and intrinsic games in Section 6.
We collect the results of the paper and present our main comparative theorems in Section
7.
2 A simple example
The main theorem of the paper (Theorem 1) establishes that competition between two
sellers facing a population of heterogeneous buyers with private information on their
willingness to pay has different implications for market coverage, depending upon the
nature of consumer preferences. In this section, we briefly develop a simple example
which provides an important intuition for the more general results that follow. We obtain
simplicity by assuming consumer preferences do not have any variation on the intensive
margins; only an extensive decision about participation exists.
Consider a consumer desiring to buy at most two units of an homogenous good with
a willingness to pay, θ, that is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, θ¯]. A consumer of
type θ has a utility function given by
u(q1, q2, θ) =
{
θ(q1 + q2) + w if q1 + q2 ≤ 2
2θ + w otherwise,
where qi ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the quantity consumed from firm i and w is wealth. Assume also
that the unit cost of production is constant at c < θ¯.
We begin with a multi-product monopolist who sells both product lines. Because the
goods are perfect substitutes this is admittedly an odd benchmark. The monopolist can
maximize its profits by offering all of its units (of both product lines) at the same price.9
The optimal price can be thought of as the optimal cutoff point, pm = θm0 , such that all
types above θm0 consume one unit of each product line and all types below θm0 refuse to
purchase. The optimal price, pm, maximizes 2(θ¯ − p)(p − c) and is characterized by the
familiar first-order condition
pm = θm0 =
1
2
(θ¯ + c).
Suppose that instead of a monopoly, there are two duopolists, each choosing their unit
prices pi noncooperatively. Under delegated agency, it is immediate that the familiar logic
9The monopolist could alternatively offer to bundle the two units and reach the same payoff.
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of Bertrand applies: In a pure-strategy equilibrium, each firm offers to sell up to two units
at a per-unit price of pd = c, profits are zero, and the marginal type is θd0 = c. It follows
that θd0 < θm0 .10
In an intrinsic common agency game, our setting of two firms making offers to a
consumer is a contrivance. It is hard to think of a market example with substitute goods
in which the consumer is required to purchase from both firms. Rather than change our
example to one of regulation or construct a more elaborate story for this case, we will stay
with our simple example. Given the agent only evaluates the gain from jointly purchasing,
the participating types will satisfy 2θ− p1 − p2 ≥ 0. Consequently, each firm i chooses pi
to maximize
(
θ¯ − (p1+p22 )) (pi − c), and the unique symmetric equilibrium has prices
pi = θi0 =
1
3
(2θ¯ + c).
It follows that pi > pm > pd and θi0 > θm0 > θd0 . Participation is greater under delegated
agency than under intrinsic common agency.
Repeating our analysis with the assumption of Leontief complements, i.e., when the
consumers’ preferences are given by
u(q1, q2, θ) =
{
2θmin{q1, q2}+ w if min{q1, q2} ≤ 1
2θ + w otherwise,
we find that the intrinsic agency and monopoly prices are unchanged, but that the del-
egated agency program is now equivalent to the intrinsic agency problem. This implies
that in the case of perfect complements, θi0 = θd0 > θm0 . The option of refusing one of
the possible contracts is inconsequential for equilibrium participation. The additional
options under competition have no impact on market coverage because the options are
unattractive. In the general model that follows, we explore the robustness of these simple
insights.
3 The model
We now recast our analysis in a richer framework, allowing for imperfect substitutability
or complementarity, multi-unit consumption and nonlinear pricing.
In what follows, we take both a general and a specific approach. We state preferences
for the firms and the agent with general functions at the outset, but we will apply the
10There are, of course, exclusive agency equilibria in which one firm sells two units at the combined price of
2c and the other firm sells zero. The welfare consequences are equivalent, however.
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results to the specific setting with quadratic preferences and a uniform distribution of
marginal utilities to produce closed-form solutions. There are a set of technical require-
ments for equilibria that have less interest to us than the fundamental economic results
presented in Theorem 1. Assuming the preferences and equilibria are sufficiently regular
produces a more transparent argument for our main results. We then can use the specific
case of the quadratic-uniform model to demonstrate that such regularity is not vacuous
and is easily satisfied by the simple models typically chosen in applications.
3.1 General preferences and information structure
We model competition between two firms (sometimes referred to generically as princi-
pals) indexed by j = 1, 2. Each of these firms offers the privately-informed consumer
(generically, the agent) a price schedule, Pj : Q '→ )+, defined over a compact set of
available outputs, Q ≡ [0, q¯] and continuous over the interior. We choose q¯ sufficiently
large that the any consumer’s utility from consuming q¯ is less than its cost of produc-
tion.11 We allow that P may have a left hand discontinuity at 0, exhibiting a fixed fee
equal to P (0+) > 0 with P (0) = 0. Upon observing the posted price schedules, the con-
sumer decides whether or not to participate and, conditionally upon participation, how
much to consume from each firm. When common agency is intrinsic, the consumer must
choose between joint contracting and non participation. In the delegated agency game,
the consumer can additionally choose to contract exclusively with either firm.
In our general setting, the consumer has a privately known type θ which is distributed
on the support [0, θ¯] according to a differentiable distribution function F (θ) and corre-
sponding density f(θ).
The consumer’s utility is quasi-linear in money and his preferences for consuming
(q1, q2) are represented by a symmetric, smooth utility function, u(q1, q2, θ), with the
properties that u is increasing in θ, has strictly increasing differences with respect to qi
and θ, is strictly concave in (q1, q2), and u(0, 0, θ) = 0 for all θ. Moreover, goods are
substitutes (respectively, complements) whenever u (resp., −u) has strictly increasing
differences with respect to q1 and q2. The consumer’s net utility of purchasing q1 and q2
is therefore
u(q1, q2, θ)− P1(q1)− P2(q2).
Each firm’s cost of producing qj is given by the symmetric, smooth cost function C(qj)
11Formally, using the notation for utility and cost that follows, u(q¯, q, θ)− u(0, q, θ) < C(q¯) for all (q, θ).
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which is continuous through the origin, with C(0) = 0, increasing and convex. Each firm
maximizes expected profit,
Eθ[Pj(qj(θ))− C(qj(θ))],
where qj(θ) is the consumer’s optimal choice given the equilibrium price schedules. We
further assume that full coverage is inefficient under full information:
uq1(0, 0, 0) < C
′(0) < uq1(0, 0, θ¯).
Given this assumption, it is efficient to serve only an upper interval of types when maxi-
mizing social surplus.
3.2 Special setting: quadratic-uniform preferences
In our specialized setting, we will place more structure on the problem by additionally
assuming the consumer’s utility function is quadratic, C(q) = cq, and θ is distributed
uniformly. We will refer to this as the quadratic-uniform case. We choose to represent the
parameters of the quadratic utility function by looking directly at the implicit demand
curves of the consumer for each good. Specifically, the consumer’s demand function for
(q1, q2) is symmetric, linear in prices, and the parameter θ appears only in the demand
intercepts:
qj = α+ θ − βpj + γp−j ,
with α > 0 and β > |γ| "= 0. This is equivalent to assuming that the agent has a quadratic
utility function for consumption of the form:12
u(q1, q2, θ) =
α+ θ
β − γ (q1 + q2)−
β
2(β2 − γ2)(q
2
1 + q
2
2)−
γ
β2 − γ2 q1q2.
For γ ∈ (0,β), goods are demand substitutes in the traditional sense, while goods are
demand complements if γ ∈ (−β, 0). In many of the calculations that follow, the relation-
ship between β and γ is homogenous and depends only on the ratio, τ ≡ γ/β, so we will
sometimes use τ to simplify the presentation. In this case, note that τ ∈ (−1, 1), τ > 0
represents the case of substitutes and τ < 0 represents the case of complements.
12These conditions on preferences are restrictive to the extent that actual demand is nonlinear in prices or
that θ affects the own or cross-price derivatives of the demand function. More generally, following Martimort
(1992), one could instead posit that the utility function satisfies a separability restriction: uqj (q1, q2, θ) =
u˜1q1(q1, ρ(q2, θ)) = u˜
2
q2(q2, ρ(q1, θ)), where u˜
j(qi, ρ) satisfies the increasing-differences condition u˜jqjρ(qj , ρ) > 0.
With the restriction to quadratic preferences in consumption, this separability restriction is equivalent to the
requirement that demand curves are linear in prices and θ only enters through the intercepts. Note that the
chosen representation provides that uθ > 0 and the standard single-crossing property uqjθ > 0 is satisfied for
each good.
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3.3 The first-best (full information) benchmark
Because preferences are symmetric and strictly concave over (q1, q2), we can define the
first-best allocation by a single function, qfb(θ) which is a pointwise solution to the fol-
lowing program:
max
q∈Q
W (q, θ) ≡ u(q, q, θ)− 2C(q),
where W (q, θ) is the social surplus function. Formally, qfb(θ) satisfies
uq1(q
fb(θ), qfb(θ), θ) = C ′(qfb(θ))
for all θ such that uq1(0, 0, θ) > C ′(0) and qfb(θ) = 0 otherwise. Given the increasing-
differences condition on u and uq1(0, 0, 0) < C ′(0), there exists a unique root, θ
fb
0 ∈ (0, θ¯),
that solves C ′(0) = uq1(0, 0, θ
fb
0 ) such that it is inefficient to serve any type less than θ
fb
0
under full information. Hence, qfb(θ) = 0 for all types θ ∈ [0, θfb0 ] and qfb(θ) > 0 for all
types θ > θfb0 .
13 We will refer to θfb0 as the marginal (participating) consumer under full
information.
Define the value function of this program by
Jfb(θ) ≡ max
q∈Q
W (q, θ),
which is continuous, strictly increasing on (θfb0 , θ¯) and zero on [0, θ
fb
0 ].
In the quadratic-uniform specification, the first-best (full information) allocation is
continuous and has a particularly simple representation:
qfb(θ) ≡ max{0, θ + α− (β − γ)c}.
Our assumption that efficient participation is less than complete implies α − (β − γ)c <
0 < θ¯ + α− (β − γ)c and the marginal consumer is given by
θfb0 ≡ (β − γ)c− α > 0.14
13Requiring that θfb0 > 0 focuses the analysis on instances in which participation is actually modified by
changes in market structure which is precisely the case we investigate presently. Otherwise, we would be
obliged to describe a variety of uninteresting and tedious cases where participation could remain unchanged. If
marginal costs are positive, it also seems reasonable that there exists a set of consumers with lower valuations
if heterogeneity is sufficiently great.
14Note also that the assumptions θfb0 > 0 and α > 0 altogether put an upper bound on the degree of
substitutability between goods that rules out the case of perfect substitutes.
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4 A methodology for best-response contracts
We are interested in characterizing equilibria to three agency games. The first is the case
in which both firms are able to collude or otherwise implement the monopoly outcome.
This is a straightforward application of optimal contract design to a two-good setting.
The other cases represent our two common agency games – delegated and intrinsic. In
all three settings, the methodology we use to construct optima and equilibria is identical
once one defines the appropriate indirect utility function for each of these games. We
present that methodology here.
4.1 The bilateral screening problem
We begin by reconsidering the bilateral contracting problem between a single firm selling
a single product line to a privately-informed consumer with an outside option of zero
utility. This is the canonical setting of the monopoly self-selection program as explored
by such papers as Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984), to list a few. The
solution to this monopoly program, however, has much value in calculating best-response
functions in a multi-principal game, so we present the details here.
The firm’s program is to choose the tariff P (q) to maximize expected profit subject to
the consumer’s choice satisfying incentive compatibility and all participating consumers
receiving non-negative rents. Assuming that the consumer’s utility function is increasing
in θ, the set of participating consumers will be an upper interval, [θ0, θ¯], where the marginal
consumer θ0 is implicitly determined by P (q).
Because we are interested in a single product line, for the moment we replace the
consumer’s multi-product preference function, u(q1, q2, θ), with a simpler function defined
over a single good, v(q, θ), and assume that v(q, θ) is nondecreasing in θ. In this case, we
abuse our notation slightly and modify the social surplus function to W (q, θ) ≡ v(q, θ)−
C(q) and again denote its maximizer as qfb(θ). We maintain our previous assumption
that the type space can be partitioned into two non-degenerate intervals – [0, θfb0 ] and
(θfb0 , θ¯] – such that q
fb(θ) = 0 on the lower interval and qfb(θ) > 0 on the upper interval.
The firm’s program can be stated as
max
P
∫ θ¯
θ0
(P (q(θ))− C(q(θ))) dF (θ),
subject to q(θ) ∈ argmaxq∈Q v(q, θ) − P (q) (incentive compatibility) and v(q(θ), θ) −
P (q(θ)) ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ θ0 (participation). Alternatively, using a change of variables,
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U(θ) ≡ v(q(θ), θ)− P (q(θ)), we can restate the program as
max
P
∫ θ¯
θ0
(v(q(θ), θ)− C(q(θ))− U(θ)) dF (θ),
subject to q(θ) ∈ argmaxq∈Q v(q, θ) − P (q) (incentive compatibility) and U(θ) ≥ 0 for
all θ ≥ θ0 (participation). Providing that v(q, θ) satisfies the single-crossing property
vqθ(q, θ) ≥ 0, we can replace the incentive constraint with the equivalent requirements
that U ′(θ) = vθ(q(θ), θ) and q(θ) is nondecreasing. Because vθ(q, θ) ≥ 0, we can replace
the participation constraints with U(θ0) ≥ 0. Integrating the objective function by parts,
this affords us the simplification
max
{q,U(θ0),θ0}
∫ θ¯
θ0
(
v(q(θ), θ)− C(q(θ))− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
vθ(q(θ), θ)− U(θ0)
)
dF (θ),
subject to q(θ) nondecreasing and U(θ0) ≥ 0. Because U(θ0) is optimally set to 0, we can
eliminate this instrument from the program. Lastly, we can define the associated virtual
surplus function for the firm as
Λ(q, θ) ≡ v(q, θ)− C(q)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
vθ(q, θ),
generating the following succinct program
max
{q,θ0}
∫ θ¯
θ0
Λ(q(θ), θ)dF (θ),
subject to q(θ) nondecreasing.
As is standard in the screening literature, we consider the relaxed program in which
the monotonicity constraint is absent. Here, the optimal q is determined by finding the
pointwise maximum of Λ(q, θ) for each θ ∈ [θ0, θ¯]. We denote this optimizer as q˜(θ),
q˜(θ) ∈ argmax
q∈Q
Λ(q, θ).
If Λ is differentiable and strictly quasi-concave in q, this relaxed solution satisfies
Λq(q˜(θ), θ) = 0.
Note that if Λ(q˜(θ), θ) is negative for some range of θ, the optimal allocation q(θ) may be
zero rather than q˜(θ). Formally, define
J(θ) ≡ Λ(q˜(θ), θ).
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Because vθ > 0, J is necessarily increasing in the neighborhood of θ¯. More generally, if
Λθ ≥ 0,15 J is weakly increasing everywhere in θ with J˙(θ) = Λθ(q(θ), θ). In this case, θ0
is simply the root of J(θ) in [0, θ¯] if it exists
Λ(q˜(θ0), θ0) = 0,
and θ0 = 0 otherwise. If J is not monotonic, then the candidates for the optimal cutoff are
still either the corner θ0 = 0 or a root of J(θ) = 0 around which J is locally nondecreasing.
Given such θ0, the optimal allocation is simply
q(θ) =
{
q˜(θ) if θ ≥ θ0,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Once one obtains the optimal q allocation, if it is strictly increasing it can be inverted
for θ−1(q) and substituted to produce the differential equation for the price schedule:
P ′(q) = vq(q, θ−1(q))
with the initial condition that P (q(θ0)) = v(q(θ0), θ0). If q(θ) is constant over an interval
of types, the differential equation can be suitably modified to allow for a kink at such
quantity.16 The solution uniquely generates the nonlinear optimal tariff P (q).
To summarize, the pointwise optimization approach above finds an optimal solution
if v and Λ have increasing differences in (q, θ), v is nondecreasing in θ, and Λ is strictly
quasi-concave in q. The assumptions that are frequently made in the traditional monopoly
screening literature (e.g., quadratic preferences and a monotone hazard rate condition)
are sufficient for these regularity requirements. We now catalogue our discussion above
with the following definition of regularity of v(q, θ) and the proposition of its consequence:
Definition 1 (Regularity) The bilateral self-selection program induced by v(q, θ) is reg-
ular if and only if
1. v(q, θ) is continuous, nondecreasing in θ, and has strict increasing differences in
(q, θ);17
2. the virtual surplus associated with v,
Λ(q, θ) ≡ v(q, θ)− C(q)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
vθ(q, θ),
15Sufficient conditions for this are that vθ > 0, vθθ ≤ 0 and the monotone hazard rate property holds.
16More precisely, suppose that [θ1, θ2] is one such pooling interval for which q(θ) = q. It follows, then, that
we have ∂P (q) = [vq(q, θ1), vq(q, θ2)] where ∂P (q) is the subdifferential of P at q.
17A function v(q, θ) has increasing differences in (q, θ) if v(q, θ) − v(q, θ′) ≥ v(q′, θ) − v(q′, θ′) for all pairs
q > q′ and θ > θ′; thus, at twice-differentiable points, vθq ≥ 0. A function has strictly increasing differences if
it satisfies the previous condition with strict inequalities.
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is strictly quasi-concave in q and has increasing differences in (q, θ).
The consequence of regularity follows.
Proposition 1 Given that v(q, θ) is regular, the firm’s optimal self-selection price sched-
ule induces q(θ) such that q(θ) = 0 for θ < θ0 and
q(θ) ∈ argmax
q∈Q
Λ(q, θ), (2)
for θ ≥ θ0. The optimal participation cutoff is either a corner, θ0 = 0, or a root
Λ(q(θ0), θ0) = 0, (3)
where in either case the virtual value function J(θ) = Λ(q(θ), θ) is nondecreasing.
There is a more specialized property of the optimal price schedule that emerges if the
utility function also satisfies v(0, θ) = 0 for all θ. We will present the result maintaining
the assumption of regularity.
Lemma 1 Suppose that v(q, θ) is regular and v(0, θ) = 0 for all θ, then the optimal
allocation, q(θ), is continuous and q(θ) = 0 for all θ ≤ θ0. The marginal participating
consumer satisfies θ0 ∈ (θfb0 , θ¯) and the corresponding tariff P is right-continuous through
the origin with P (0) = 0.
This idea follows quite naturally from the assumption that the social surplus function,
v(q, θ) − C(q), is continuous through the origin. As such, discontinuities in the price
schedule at the origin are suboptimal and, provided that there is less than full coverage
under monopoly, the marginal consumer consumes zero and is not charged a fixed fee for
access.18 Particularly in our analysis of the delegated common agency game, this lemma
will be valuable. In the game of intrinsic common agency, the lemma is inapplicable and
we will obtain discontinuous allocations.
4.2 Applying the methodology to multi-product monopoly
We can apply Proposition 1 directly to the monopoly setting to obtain our second bench-
mark by noting that the strict concavity and symmetry of u(q1, q2, θ) implies that the mo-
nopolist’s optimal tariff also solves the program for vm(q, θ) ≡ u(q, q, θ), Cm(q) = 2C(q),
18This remarkably simple and powerful idea – that in the absence of fixed costs tariffs should not exhibit
positive access prices – is discussed at some length in Wilson (1993, section 6.7).
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and Λm(q, θ) constructed accordingly. Because u(0, 0, θ) = 0 for all θ and uq1(0, 0, 0) <
C ′(0) < uq1(0, 0, θ¯), Lemma 1 applies and the monopoly allocation qm(θ) must be contin-
uous with a price schedule passing through the origin.
An immediate comparison can be made between the full-information and monopoly
allocations by simply comparing the two pointwise programs. Note that
Λm(q, θ) = W (q, θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uθ(q, q, θ).
Because W is strictly concave and uqθ(q, θ) > 0, the pointwise optimum of Λm(q, θ) must
exceed that which maximizes W (q, θ). Hence, for all θ ∈ (θm0 , θ¯), we have qm(θ) < qfb(θ).
Because qm(θ) and qfb(θ) are both continuous, it follows immediately from this ordering
that θm0 > θ
fb
0 . Collecting these results together, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the monopoly screening program is regular, then
θ¯ > θm0 > θ
fb
0
and for all participating consumers θ ∈ [θm0 , θ¯)
qm(θ) < qfb(θ)
with qm(θ¯) = qfb(θ¯).
In the quadratic-uniform setting regularity and monotonicity in value is easily verified.
To provide a closed-form benchmark, we present the solution for this special case.
Proposition 3 In the quadratic-uniform monopoly setting, the marginal consumer is
given by
θ¯ > θm0 =
1
2
(
θ¯ + θfb0
)
> θfb0 . (4)
and the firm’s allocation is distorted below the first best with the continuous allocation
qm(θ) = qfb(θ)− (θ¯ − θ)
for all θ ∈ [θm0 , θ¯].
As is well known, the intensive marginal distortions under the monopoly pricing arise
because the firm trades off the marginal gain of increased output to any type θ against
the inframarginal loss of reduced revenues on all types greater than θ. A straightforward
result that is slightly less well known is that the monopolist distorts on the extensive
margin for similar reasons. In the case of quadratic-uniform preferences, the monopolist
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chooses a participation cutoff that is the average of the first-best cutoff, θfb0 , and the
highest type, θ¯. In the applications of delegated and intrinsic agency that follow, a
weighted average of θfb0 and θ¯ will also describe the marginal customer, but their weights
will differ from 50:50. It is also worth noting that in the monopoly setting, the range of
quantities served remains the same as in the first best, namely, Qfb = Qm = [0, qfb(θ¯)]. As
we will see, this range will also arise in the delegated game because of Lemma 1, but the
range of quantities will be strictly smaller in the intrinsic game for which the assumptions
of Lemma 1 are violated.
4.3 Applying the methodology to multi-principal games
The key insight in understanding multi-principal games is that in any pure-strategy equi-
librium to a multi-principal game, any individual firm (say, for example, firm 1) behaves
as a monopolist facing an agent with the following indirect preference function:
v(q, θ) ≡ max
q˜∈Q
u(q, q˜, θ)− P2(q˜)− φ(θ),
where φ(θ) is the reservation utility obtained if firm 1’s contract is rejected. The indirect
utility function v represents the net gain from contracting with firm 1 for a consumption
of q. Of course φ takes different values depending on whether we consider an intrinsic or
a delegated common agency game.
If we can establish the regularity of v(q, θ), we can apply the results from Proposition
1. v is also increasing in q. Beyond these properties, we will need to consider the specific
nature of the goods and the form of the common agency game to verify if v is regular.
Indeed, when the goods are substitutes, the regularity of v can only be established by
first constructing candidate equilibrium tariffs and checking for regularity, ex post. This
calculation, fortunately, is straightforward with the additional structure of the quadratic-
uniform setting.
To be clear about our approach, in the analysis that follows we proceed by assuming
regularity at the outset.19 We apply Proposition 1 and deduce properties of the firm’s
best-response price schedule and find a symmetric fixed point in the best-response cor-
respondences of the principals. We then verify that such candidate price schedules do
indeed induce regularity in the indirect utility functions, implying that they constitute
19Because our approach is restricted to regular, symmetric equilibria, it is perhaps a refinement on the
equilibrium set. We have decided not to undertake a general study of equilibria in which the single-crossing
property is violated or the equilibrium is asymmetric.
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an equilibrium. Because the indirect utility functions are different across delegated and
indirect common agency games, we study each game in turn.
Delegated common-agency game. Given our focus on symmetric equilibria, we will
construct our indirect utility function under the assumption that the equilibrium consists
of each firm offering P (q) to the agent. In the case of delegated agency, we take the
convention that each firm is required to offer P (0) = 0 as a component of its tariff schedule.
This is without loss of generality.20 That said, we will reserve the term participation to
describe a consumer’s choice of positive consumption.
Recall that Proposition 1 applies to the case in which the agent’s reservation utility
is zero. As such, we need to construct vd(q, θ) to capture the participating consumer’s
net utility of contracting with a firm for a positive amount q > 0, relative to the best
alternative of either non-participation or exclusive contracting with the rival. Because
P (q) implicitly allows for non-participation, we need only subtract the consumer’s outside
option of exclusively contracting with the rival. That is, in the case of delegation games,
φd(θ) = maxq∈Q u(0, q, θ)− P (q), and so
vd(q, θ) ≡
(
max
q˜∈Q
u(q, q˜, θ)− P (q˜)
)
−
(
max
q˜∈Q
u(0, q˜, θ)− P (q˜)
)
.
Note that in the case of delegated agency, there is no fixed effect in net utility, vd(0, θ) = 0
for all θ. Hence Lemma 1 applies and tariffs are necessarily continuous through the origin
whenever there is less than full coverage and the equilibrium is symmetric and regular.
Some components of regularity can easily be verified for vd. Because vd is a linear
combination of continuous value functions, vd is continuous. It is immediate, as well, that
vd is increasing in q. Perhaps less obvious, if vd has (resp., strict) increasing differences,
then vd is nondecreasing in θ (resp., increasing). To understand why, it is helpful to
define the consumer’s optimal purchase from firm 2, given a purchase of q from firm 1 in
a symmetric equilibrium in which both firms offer P (q):
q∗(q, θ) ∈ argmax
q˜∈Q
u(q, q˜, θ)− P (q˜).
Because we consider only pure-strategy equilibria, we focus on the case where q∗(q, θ) is
a well-defined equilibrium function.21 This allows us to express the derivative of vd with
20We could, alternatively, allow firms to offer price schedules which are strictly positive at 0, but the agent
could choose not to participate effectively choosing the P (0) = 0 option under our convention.
21Hence, we rule out cases where the agent’s optimal choice is multi-valued either on or off the equilibrium
path. This can be viewed as a minor refinement within a potentially larger set of equilibria but this required
uniqueness of the agent’s best-response is satisfied by our quadratic-uniform model.
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respect to θ as
vdθ (q, θ) = uθ(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ)− uθ(0, q∗(0, θ), θ) =
∫ q
0
vdqθ(x, θ)dx.
Hence, that vd has (resp. strict) increasing differences is sufficient for weak (resp. strict)
monotonicity in θ.
Determining if vd has such increasing differences in (q, θ) is more difficult. From
the previous expression, having increasing differences is equivalent to establishing that
uθ(q, q∗(q, θ), θ) is nondecreasing in q. Because q∗(q, θ) is monotonic, it is differentiable
almost everywhere. At all points of differentiability, we have
vdqθ(q, θ) = uq1θ(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ) + uq2θ(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ)
∂q∗(q, θ)
∂q
.
Observe that the q appears directly as an argument of the utility function and indirectly
as an argument of q∗(q, θ). By assumption, uqiθ(q1, q2, θ) > 0, which signs the first term
positively. When the goods are complements, q∗(q, θ) is nondecreasing in q; in this case,
the second term reinforces the first, and vd has strictly increasing differences. When the
goods are substitutes, however, the indirect and direct effects are in opposition. Therefore,
for vd to have strictly increasing differences in (q, θ), the equilibrium construction of
∂q∗(q,θ)
∂q must not be too large and negative. In the case of our quadratic-uniform setting,
fortunately, equilibrium regularity is directly verifiable.22
In addition to the conditions on vd, regularity also requires that the virtual surplus
function, Λd, that is derived from vd have increasing differences and be strictly quasi-
concave. Given that vd has strict increasing differences, it is sufficient for Λd to have
increasing differences that θ − (1 − F (θ)/f(θ) is nondecreasing and vdqθθ ≤ 0. In our
specific quadratic-uniform model, these conditions are easily verified. Λd is also strictly
quasi-concave in the quadratic-uniform setting, but this verification is less straightforward.
When computing q∗(q, θ), we need to account for the possibility that a critical value of
q could induce the agent to choose the corner solution of q∗(q, θ) = 0. Economically,
q∗(q, θ) = 0 corresponds to inducing the consumer to chose exclusivity rather than com-
mon agency. Technically, such a corner solution generates a discontinuity in the derivative
of q∗(q, θ). Precisely at this point, Λd(q, θ) will be exhibit a kink. Thus, even if Λd is
strictly concave on both sides of the kink (as it is in the quadratic-uniform specification),
it is unclear whether or not such a kink destroys strict quasi-concavity. Fortunately, we
22Martimort (1992) and Stole (1991) showed that regularity holds beyond the quadratic case in models of
intrinsic agency.
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are able to show in Lemma 2 in the Appendix that these kinks are concavity-preserving
in the general setting.
Intrinsic common-agency game. When common agency is intrinsic, the agent does
not have the option to participate exclusively with one of the principals and so φi(θ) = 0.
It follows that the corresponding indirect utility function is
vi(q, θ) ≡ max
q˜∈Q
u(q, q˜, θ)− P (q˜).
It is important to note that because an active agreement requires that the rival principal’s
contract is also accepted by the agent, vi(q, θ) may be negative over some subset of Q×Θ.
Thus, the option of non-participation may be optimal, but this option is not embedded in
vi(q, θ). Hence, the principal will need to compare the maximized virtual value function,
J i(θ) ≡ maxq∈Q Λi(q, θ), to the option of nonparticipation with payoff 0.
Some properties of vi(q, θ) are otherwise similar to those of vd(q, θ): The indirect utility
function is continuous and increasing in q. Moreover, it is also increasing in θ because
the agent’s reservation utility is type independent in the intrinsic game and viθ(q, θ) =
uθ(q, q∗(q, θ), θ) > 0.
Verifying regularity in the equilibria of the intrinsic game suffers from similar difficul-
ties as discussed for the delegated game. In Proposition 7, however, we are able to prove
that any regular, symmetric equilibrium of the delegated game will have a corresponding
regular, symmetric equilibrium in the intrinsic game. Thus, verifying the regularity of an
equilibrium in the delegated game is sufficient for our purposes of studying the intrinsic
game.
5 The delegated common-agency game
Consider any equilibrium to the delegated common-agency game. We say that the equi-
librium is regular if each firm’s price schedule generates a regular indirect utility function
vis-a-vis the rival firm. Given that vd(0, θ) = 0 for all θ, regularity and Lemma 1 im-
plies that each consumption schedule qi(θ) is continuous. Suppose in addition that the
equilibrium is symmetric and each firm offers P d(q) which induces vd(q, θ) as the sym-
metric indirect utility function and which is differentiable on (0, q¯).23 Let Λd(q, θ) be the
23If principals were asymmetric, we would have to address the possibility that those principals might have
different market shares so that, for instance, exclusivity arises endogenously for a subset of the type space. We
leave the analysis of those complex issues for further research.
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corresponding virtual surplus function. Proposition 1 implies that
qd(θ) ∈ argmax
q∈Q
Λd(q, θ),
and either θd0 = 0 or Λd(q(θd0), θd0) = 0. At this point, several economic implications
necessarily follow.
Proposition 4 Suppose that {qd(θ), θd0} is the allocation in a regular, symmetric equilib-
rium in the delegated agency game with equilibrium tariff, P d(q), differentiable on (0, q¯).
Then
• the equilibrium tariff, P d(q), is continuous at q = 0 (i.e., no fixed fee);
• in the case of substitutes:
θfb0 < θ
d
0 < θ
m
0 ,
and
qfb(θ) ≥ qd(θ) ≥ qm(θ),
with strict inequalities for all θ ∈ (θd0 , θ¯) and equalities at θ¯;
• in the case of complements:
θfb0 < θ
m
0 < θ
d
0 ,
and
qfb(θ) > qm(θ) ≥ qd(θ),
with strict inequalities for all θ ∈ (θm0 , θ¯) and equalities at θ¯.
Note that the allocation under complements is distorted below that of monopoly on both
the intensive and extensive margins; the reverse being true for the case of substitutes.
The result is similar in spirit to the discussion by Cournot (1838) who observed that
competition in prices between complementary producers reduces both consumer surplus
and profits, as each firm separately introduces a distortion that reduces the demand for the
other firm’s product, and hence its profitability. An integrated monopoly would introduce
a smaller distortion. Remarkably, a similar intuition is present when strategy spaces are
enlarged to allow nonlinear price schedules.
It is also worth noting that the requirement of differentiability, while a reasonable
restriction and one that is satisfied in the equilibria of the quadratic-uniform model, is
not essential for the central conclusion in Proposition 4. As the proof demonstrates, a
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re-statement of the proposition using weak inequalities everywhere for the ordering of
allocations can be proven without recourse to differentiability.
The previous results are only necessary conditions. We now turn to our specific setting
of quadratic-uniform preferences to establish that a regular, symmetric equilibrium exists.
To this end, we take advantage of the homogeneity in preferences by substituting for
τ = γβ ∈ (−1, 1).24
Proposition 5 In the quadratic-uniform delegated game, the following constitutes a reg-
ular symmetric equilibrium
qd(θ) = qfb(θ)− (θ¯ − θ)
(
1− 4τ
1 +
√
1 + 8τ2
)
= qm(θ) + (θ¯ − θ)
(
4τ
1 +
√
1 + 8τ2
)
(5)
for all θ ∈ [θd0 , θ¯], qd(θd0) = 0 for all θ ≤ θd0, and qd(θ) is continuous and increasing, where
θd0 = λ
d(τ)θfb0 + (1− λd(τ))θ¯, (6)
and λd(τ) = 12 +
√
1+8τ2+2τ−1
4(1+τ) , λ
d(τ) ∈ (13 , 1).
Consistent with the findings in Martimort (1992) and Stole (1991) for the case of
intrinsic common agency with complementary goods, qd(θ) < qm(θ) < qfb(θ), and thus the
distortion is greater with competing principals relative to the multi-product monopolist.
The extreme case is obtained when goods are almost perfect complements, i.e., τ → −1;
qd(θ) involves a double distortion with respect to the monopoly outcome. When the goods
are substitutes, qfb(θ) > qd(θ) > qm(θ) and the consumption distortion is smaller with
competing principals relative to the multi-product monopolist. As τ approaches 1, the
goods become closer substitutes, and qd(θ) approaches qfb(θ).25
A numerical example of a quadratic-uniform equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. For
purposes of illustrating the cases of substitutes and complements within the same graph,
we have fixed the value of β− γ rendering the monopoly and first-best solutions invariant
to offsetting changes in β and γ. In the case of substitutes, we have assumed γ = 1 > 0
and β = 2; in the case of complements we have taken γ = −13 < 0 and β = 23 .
24It is worth noting that once either qfb(θ) or qm(θ) are defined, qd(θ) can be determined knowing only τ .
The calculation of qfb(θ) and qm(θ), however, depends upon the difference β − γ. The same is true for the
calculations of θd0 and θ
fb
0 or θm0 .
25Some care needs to be taken in the interpretation of the perfect substitutes limit because the assumption
of θfb0 > 0 puts a lower bound on β − γ and an upper bound on τ when α > 0.
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Figure 1: Quadratic-uniform preferences with θ¯ = 10, α = 1, c = 2, and β − γ = 1. The case of
substitutes is modeled with γ = 1 > 0; the case of complements is modelled with γ = −13 < 0. Because
β − γ is held constant, qfb(θ) and qm(θ) are invariant across the cases.
6 The intrinsic common-agency game
We now return to the case of intrinsic common agency. Recall that
vi(q, θ) ≡ max
q˜∈Q
u(q, q˜, θ)− P (q˜),
but this value is not necessarily nonnegative and generally vi(0, θ) "= 0 for all θ. Never-
theless, with the assumption of regularity, we can deduce several properties of equilibria
in intrinsic games by simply comparing them to the analogous monopoly and delegated
outcomes. The first result relates the intrinsic outcome to the monopoly outcome under
the assumption of regularity.
Proposition 6 For any regular, symmetric intrinsic equilibrium
θi0 ≥ θm0 .
If the equilibrium tariff is differentiable on the interior of Q, then this inequality is strict.
The monopolist introduces a smaller participation distortion than competing firms
under intrinsic agency, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements
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on the intensive margin. This result is surprising given that we normally think of com-
petition as increasing efficiency, except when the goods are demand complements. Here,
on the other hand, is a setting where inefficient exclusion is more pronounced under com-
petition – even when the goods are substitutes on the intensive margin. It is perhaps
less surprising once we understand that intrinsic agency is equivalent to delegated agency
with goods that are perfect complements at the base level (extensive margin). Perfect
complementarity on the extensive margin implies that competition generates greater ex-
tensive (participation) distortions relative to monopoly. The nature of preferences on the
intensive margins is therefore irrelevant. This is the remarkable content of the proposi-
tion: Perfect complementarity on the extensive margin is the unique source of the higher
participation inefficiencies.
We next turn to a more remarkable comparison between intrinsic and delegated agency
participation.
Proposition 7 Suppose that P d(q) is a symmetric equilibrium in a regular delegated
agency game. Then there exists a P0 > 0 such that
P i(q) ≡ P d(q) + P0
is a symmetric equilibrium in the intrinsic game.
The simple fact that for every equilibrium to the delegated game there exists a corre-
sponding equilibrium to the intrinsic game in which the tariffs are shifted up by a fixed
fee generates an immediate characterization of the equilibrium allocation.
Corollary 1 For any regular symmetric equilibrium outcome in the delegated game, {qd(θ), θd0},
the corresponding symmetric intrinsic equilibrium satisfies
θi0 > θ
d
0 ,
and
qi(θ) =
{
qd(θ) > 0, if θ ≥ θi0,
0, if θ < θi0.
The allocation qi(θ) is discontinuous at θi0.
Returning to our specific quadratic-uniform setting, we can use our previously estab-
lished fact that there exists a regular, symmetric, linear equilibrium to the delegated game
to derive the corresponding equilibrium in the intrinsic game.
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Proposition 8 In the quadratic-uniform delegated game, the following constitutes a reg-
ular symmetric equilibrium
qi(θ) = qfb(θ)− (θ¯ − θ)
(
1− 4τ
1 +
√
1 + 8τ2
)
= qm(θ) + (θ¯ − θ)
(
4τ
1 +
√
1 + 8τ2
)
(7)
for all θ ∈ [θi0, θ¯] and qi(θ) = 0 for θ < θi0, where
θi0 = λ
i(τ)θfb0 + (1− λi(τ))θ¯, (8)
where λi(τ) = 1+
√
1+8τ2
4(1+τ)+4
√
1+8τ2
< min
{
1
2 ,λ
d(τ)
}
, and qi(θ) is discontinuous with qi(θi0) >
0.
It is worth emphasizing that the residual utility function under intrinsic agency is
such that vi(0, θ) "= 0 for all θ and the marginal customer consumes a positive amount
regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. The marginal consumer pays
a positive fixed fee to access even a small purchase from firm 2. Serving such a marginal
type would require that firm 1 subsidizes consumption of his own good with a negative
fee. This is of course viewed as costly by this firm who prefers to restrict market coverage;
it follows that the marginal customer consumes a positive amount. The consumption
discontinuity of the marginal consumer also implies that the equilibrium consumption set
in the intrinsic game, Qi = {0} ∪ [qi(θi0), qfb(θ¯)], is a strict subset of that available under
full information, monopoly, and the delegated games: Qfb = Qm = Qd = [0, qfb(θ¯)].
Returning to our numerical example from Section 5, we can illustrate how the alloca-
tions change in the intrinsic common agency game.
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Figure 2: Quadratic-uniform preferences with θ¯ = 10, α = 1, c = 2, and β − γ = 1. The case of
substitutes is modeled with γ = 1 > 0; the case of complements is modelled with γ = −13 < 0. Because
β − γ is held constant, qfb(θ) and qm(θ) are invariant across the cases. The dashed lines indicate the
corresponding delegated allocations. The vertical dotted lines indicate the discontinuity points at θi0.
Notice that the extensive distortion in the intrinsic agency can dominate the intensive
distortions in magnitude.
7 Comparison across games
Our primary motivation in this paper was to understand how variations in the agency
game affect equilibrium outcomes on the extensive margin. Collecting and organizing all
of our previous results, we can state our main theorem:
Theorem 1 Suppose that there exists a symmetric, regular equilibrium to the delegated
common agency game. Then there also exists a symmetric equilibrium of the intrinsic
agency game with identical price margins for participating consumers and allocation qi(θ)
satisfying the following conditions:
• when the goods are substitutes:
θfb0 < θ
d
0 < θ
m
0 < θ
i
0 < θ¯, (9)
and for all θ ∈ [θi0, θ¯),
qfb(θ) > qd(θ) = qi(θ) > qm(θ). (10)
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• when the goods are complements:
θfb0 < θ
m
0 < θ
d
0 < θ
i
0 < θ¯, (11)
and for all θ ∈ [θi0, θ¯),
qfb(θ) > qm(θ) > qd(θ) = qi(θ). (12)
Furthermore, when preferences are quadratic-uniform, regular, symmetric equilibria exist.
It is also worth comparing the consumer’s rents under both regimes. Given the con-
sumer’s preferences have strictly increasing differences, it follows that consumer surplus
is higher if the integral of an increasing function of consumption is higher.
U(θ) =
∫ θ
0
uθ(q(t), q(t), t)dt.
Although output remains the same under intrinsic and delegated agencies for those con-
sumers who participate in both games, the fact that θi0 > θd0 in Theorem 1 leads us to an
unambiguous conclusion:
Corollary 2 For all consumer types who participate in the delegated agency game, θ > θd0,
consumer surplus is strictly higher in the delegated game than in the associated intrinsic
game. For nonparticipating types, θ ≤ θd0, consumer surplus is zero in both games.
In short, delegated common agency benefits the consumer because it unambiguously in-
creases market coverage.
We began this paper considering two applications - regulation and competitive nonlin-
ear pricing. The theorem provides insights into each. In settings in which intrinsic agency
is institutionally imposed such as the regulation of firms by multiple governmental author-
ities, we can expect regulatory “competition” to reduce the number of firms participating
in the industry because of the greater regulatory burden it generates. Of the firms that
chose to participate and submit to regulation, as shown by Martimort (1992) and Stole
(1991), indirect externalities between regulatory bodies may increase or decrease social ef-
ficiency, depending upon the nature of the regulated activities (i.e., whether the activities
are substitutes or complements on the intensive margin) and the nature of the private in-
formation. For example, take the case of a public utility in which the private information
is a cost-efficiency parameter for the production of output and the reduction of pollution,
and the relevant agencies are the public utility commission and an environmental pro-
tection agency. If the activities are substitutes (e.g., producing greater output requires
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using less efficient and less green idle plant capacity), then each independent regulator will
distort output less and reduce pollution less than they would if they merged and offered
coordinated price-setting and pollution regulation. It follows that environmentalists who
are “greener” than the environmental protection agency would prefer that the agencies
are prohibited from cooperating even though the environmental protection agency would
prefer to coordinate with the public utility commission. Of course, if the activities are
complements (perhaps less plausible in the public utility context, but more plausible in
the case of a firm being taxed simultaneously by two authorities on closely-related output
measures) these findings would be reversed for the intensive margins.
We can also reinterpret our results in Theorem 1 to understand nonlinear pricing
when demand preferences vary over both the intensive and extensive margins. To this
end, consider a setting in which preferences on the intensive margin are captured by γ
as before, but the goods on the extensive (base) margin can be either independent goods
or perfect complements. For concreteness, suppose that there are two firms competing
with nonlinear prices in a delegated agency market setting. If the goods are perfect
complements on the base margin, then some consumption from each firm is necessary to
obtain value from either good (i.e., u(q1, 0, θ) = u(0, q2, θ) = 0); if they are independent
(the case considered in the previous sections of this paper), then valuable consumption
is possible from a single firm. A few conclusions are immediate from the application of
Theorem 1. First, if either the goods are complements on the intensive margin or the
goods are perfect complements on the extensive margin, then θ0 > θm0 . If the goods are
independent on the extensive margin and substitutes on the intensive margin, then we
have the outcome of the delegated agency game, θfb0 < θ0 < θ
m
0 . And, of course, if the
goods are independent on the intensive margin, then we have two unrelated monopolies.
The practical import of this reinterpretation is that it allows us to think about a broader
set of problems.
For example, we can now understand what would happen in a delegation setting
when the goods are substitutes on the intensive margin but perfect complements on the
extensive (or base) margin. Suppose that the personal computer market consists of one
monopolist selling operating systems and another monopolist selling computer hardware.
The goods are arguably perfect complements on the extensive margin (i.e., you need one
of each to obtain any value), but the quality of the computer’s CPU may be a substitute
for the quality of the operating system. If both vendors practice second-degree price
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discrimination and offer a menu of different qualities, the equilibrium set of the delegated
game is equivalent to the equilibrium set of the intrinsic game because of the perfect
complementarity on the base margin. It follows that (relative to a merger of the two
monopolists) competition generates higher quality software and hardware for purchasing
consumers but fewer consumers purchase computers relative to the case of cooperating
monopolists. In Figure 2, the relevant comparison is between qi(θ) under substitutes and
qm(θ).
There are still other preferences to consider. There is the possibility that the base
goods are perfect (extensive) substitutes, meaning that at most one of the two goods can
generate value to a consumer. Now there is no meaning to an assumption of substitutes
or complements on the intensive margin. Perfect competition with exclusive agency and
marginal cost pricing emerges as a pure-strategy equilibrium when firms and preferences
are symmetric.26
8 Concluding remarks
Our primary question has been, “How does competition (in its two possible manifesta-
tions) affect the participation region of consumers?” The short answer: competition with
delegated agency and demand substitutes leads to lower participation distortion relative
to monopoly; competition with either intrinsic agency or delegated agency with demand
complements leads to greater participatory distortions.
In settings in which intrinsic agency is not imposed but arises as a natural characteristic
of consumer demand (i.e., that base goods are perfect complements on the extensive
margin), we again conclude that participation distortions under competition are greater
than in the case of multi-product monopoly. When the goods are demand complements
on the intensive margin (i.e., γ > 0), participating consumers will be inefficiently under-
served relative to monopoly; when goods are demand substitutes on the intensive margin
(i.e., γ < 0), participating consumers are more efficiently served relative to monopoly. It
follows that when goods are perfect complements on the extensive margin but substitutes
on the intensive margin, participation decisions are more distorted while marginal output
or quality decisions are less distorted. In this sense, it is important to understand the
nature of consumer preferences when evaluating the social impact of merger.
26With additional product differentiation capturing only a fixed effect for brand preference, one can enlarge
this category to contain interesting examples of duopoly price discrimination that depart from marginal cost
pricing, as in Rochet and Stole (2002).
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Finally, our results, when reinterpreted, allow us to revisit on old question of the non-
linear pricing literature which goes back at least to Mussa and Rosen (1978): when does
competition increase the space of product offerings? Of course, in that interpretation of
our model, the qi are no longer quantities but indexes of the quality of each good. With
this reinterpretation, the product space is then viewed as the set of qualities offered in
equilibrium. There are two effects to consider. When goods are complements (substitutes)
on the extensive margins, we have seen that participation is reduced (increased) and this
first effect reduces (does not affect) the range of qualities. When goods are complements
(substitutes) on the intensive margins, we have also documented that the quality range
is enlarged (unaffected) and consumption distortions increased (reduced) compared with
the monopoly outcome. Combining these effects, the outcome is unambiguous only for
the case of extensive complements and intensive substitutes, and competition unambigu-
ously lowers the range of product qualities.27 In other cases, the effects are opposing. For
example, when goods are substitutes on the extensive and intensive margins, competition
reduces the product space for a given participation rate but enlarges the participation
set so that, in the end, the range of equilibrium quantities under first-best and delegated
agency are the same. This result stands in sharp contrast with earlier analysis of com-
petition between vertically differentiated suppliers be it passive like in Champsaur and
Rochet (1989) or active like in Stole (1995). There competition introduces a non-zero par-
ticipation constraint which always limits the product space. Whether competition should
lead to too many or too few products remains to be seen on a case by case basis but we
hope that our taxonomy will help to clarify that issue.
27Given that the case of intensive complements and extensive substitutes is vacuous (as argued above), we
ignore this case.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Because Λ(q, θ) is strictly quasi-concave in q, it follows from the
Maximum Theorem that q˜(θ) = argmaxq∈Q Λ(q, θ) is a well-defined, continuous function
and the value function for this program, J(θ) ≡ Λ(q˜(θ), θ) is also continuous.
Because v(0, θ) = 0 for all θ, it follows that vθ(0, θ) = 0 and Λ(0, θ) = 0 for all θ as
well. Hence, J(θ) = maxq∈Q Λ(q, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. For this it follows that q(θ) = q˜(θ) for
all θ, and q(θ) is continuous.
The marginal participating type is θ0 ≡ max {θ | q˜(θ) = 0}. Define the social surplus
function as W (q, θ) ≡ v(q, θ) − C(q). By assumption, its maximizer is positive for all
θ ∈ (θfb0 , θ¯]. Because Λ(q, θ¯) = W (q, θ¯) for all q, it therefore follows that qfb(θ¯) = q˜(θ¯) > 0.
Hence, θ0 < θ¯. For θ < θ¯, we have Λ(q, θ) ≤ W (q, θ), with a strict inequality for any
q > 0. Thus, for all θ ∈ (θfb0 , θ¯),
J(θ) = max
q∈Q
Λ(q, θ) < max
q∈Q
W (q, θ).
It follows that any root of J(θ) = 0 must satisfy θ0 ∈ (θfb0 , θ¯). !
Proof of Proposition 3: Inserting the quadratic-uniform preferences into the first-order
equation Λm(qm(θ), θ) = 0, we obtain:
α+ θ − qm(θ)− c(β − γ) = θ¯ − θ,
or, after simplification, qm(θ) = qfb(θ)− (θ¯ − θ). Finally,
Jm(θ) = Λm(qm(θ), θ) =
qm(θ)2
β − γ ≤ J
fb(θ) =
qfb(θ)2
β − γ
where the latter definitions are available also when qm(θ) or/and qfb(θ) are zero. It im-
mediately follows from qm(θm) = 0 that θm is the mean between θfb0 and θ¯. !
Proof of Proposition 4: The fact that P d(q) is continuous through the origin with no
fixed fee follows directly from Lemma 1 and vd(0, θ) = 0 for all θ.
Recall the consumer’s best choice from the rival firm’s contract:
q∗(q, θ) = argmax
q˜∈Q
u(q, q˜, θ)− P d(q˜).
q∗(q, θ) is nondecreasing in θ and weakly increasing (resp., decreasing) in q if the goods
are complements (resp., substitutes). Monotonicity also implies that q∗(q, θ) is almost
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everywhere differentiable. Moreover, observe that, whenever P is differentiable on (0, q¯),
we have for any q such that q∗(q, θ) is interior,
P d
′
(q∗(q, θ)) = uq(q, q∗(q, θ), θ).
This implies that P d′(q∗(q, θ)) < uq(q′, q∗(q, θ), θ) (resp. >) whenever goods are comple-
ments (resp. substitutes). Therefore, from the fact that q∗(q, θ) is uniquely defined at any
q, q∗(q, θ) is strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) in q and thus ∂q
∗
∂q (q, θ) > 0 (resp. <).
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Now, consider the virtual surplus function Λd(q, θ). Using the function q∗(q, θ) and
the Envelope Theorem, we can write its derivative at all points of differentiability as
Λdq(q, θ) = uq(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ)− C ′(q)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(q, q∗(q, θ), θ)
(
1 +
∂q∗
∂q
(q, θ)
)
.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium allocation qd(θ) = q∗(qd(θ), θ) and a type θ such
that Λdq(qd(θ), θ) = 0. Comparing the margins of Λd and Λm, each evaluated at qd(θ), we
have an identity for all θ:
Λdq(q
d(θ), θ) =
1
2
Λmq (q
d(θ), θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(qd(θ), qd(θ), θ)
∂q∗(qd(θ), θ)
∂q
.
Thus,
Λdq(q
d(θ), θ) = 0 >
1
2
Λmq (q
d(θ), θ) ⇔ ∂q
∗
∂q
(qd(θ), θ) < 0.
It follows that for any θ ∈ (θd0 , θ¯), in the case of substitutes, qd(θ) > qm(θ) and in the
case of complements, qd(θ) < qm(θ). Moreover, by Lemma 1, these allocations are all
continuous at the participation boundaries so in the case of substitutes, θd0 < θm0 and in
the case of complements, θd0 > θm0 .
Comparing the margins of Λd and W , each evaluated at qd(θ), we have for all θ:
Λdq(q
d(θ), θ) =
1
2
Wq(qd(θ), θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(qd(θ), qd(θ), θ)
(
1 +
∂q∗(qd(θ), θ)
∂q
)
.
Because vd has strict increasing differences in (q, θ), along the equilibrium consumption,
qd(θ),
vdqθ(q
d(θ), θ) = uqθ(qd(θ), qd(θ), θ)
(
1 +
∂q∗(qd(θ), θ)
∂q
)
> 0.
Λdq(q
d(θ), θ) = 0 ≤ 1
2
Wq(qd(θ), θ).
with a strict inequality for θ "= θ¯. Hence, for all θ ∈ (θd0 , θ¯), regardless of whether the
goods are substitutes or complements, we have qd(θ) < qfb(θ) which proves existence of
28Note that without differentiability, we would only have weak inequalities for the derivative of q∗(q, θ), which
would only allows us to establish weak inequalities in the allocation orderings. This is the full import of the
assumption.
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a θd0 ∈ (θfb0 , θ¯) such that Λdq(qd(θd0), θd0) = 0. !
As we discussed in the text, one has to exercise caution in taking derivatives of Λd(q, θ)
with respect to q because the derivatives of q∗(q, θ) will be discontinuous at the instant
where either q∗(q, θ) = 0 or q¯. This introduces a kink in Λd. Fortunately, at all such
points of nondifferentiability, the kinks preserve concavity (i.e., the right derivative is less
than the left derivative). We state and prove this result here.
Lemma 2 Suppose that P (q) ≥ C(q) for all q ∈ Q and (qˆ, θ) is a point at which Λd(q, θ)
is nondifferentiable in q. The left and right derivatives of Λd(q, θ) satisfy
lim
q↑qˆ
Λdq(q, θ) > lim
q↓qˆ
Λdq(q, θ).
Proof of Lemma 2 First, note that it can never be the case that q¯ = q∗(q, θ) because
u(q, q¯, θ)−u(q, 0, θ) < C(q¯) ≤ P (q¯) by assumption. Any kink must occur where q∗(q, θ) =
0. We next define qˆ(θ) as the critical value of output such that
q∗(qˆ(θ), θ) ≡ 0.
Consider the case of complements. Note that q∗(qd(θ), θ) = qd(θ) ≥ 0, so it follows
that qd(θ) ≥ qˆ(θ). Differentiating Λd over the separate regions of q, we have
Λq(q, θ) =

uq(q, q∗(q, θ), θ)− C ′(q)−
1−F (θ)
f(θ) uqθ(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ)
(
1 + ∂q
∗
∂q (q, θ)
)
, if q > qˆ(θ);
uq(q, 0, θ)− C ′(q)− 1−F (θ)f(θ) uqθ(q, 0, θ), if q < qˆ(θ).
Because q∗(q, θ) is continuous in q, we know that the left and right limits are equal:
q∗(qˆ(θ)−, θ) = q∗(qˆ(θ)+, θ) = 0. Thus,
lim
q↑qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ) = uq(qˆ(θ), 0, θ)− C ′(qˆ(θ))−
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(qˆ(θ), 0, θ),
lim
q↓qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ) = uq(qˆ(θ), 0, θ)− C ′(qˆ(θ))−
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(qˆ(θ), 0, θ)
(
1 +
∂q∗
∂q
(qˆ(θ)+, θ)
)
.
Because the goods are complements ∂q
∗
∂q (qˆ(θ)
+, θ) > 0, implying
lim
q↑qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ) > lim
q↓qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ).
When the goods are substitutes, q∗(qd(θ), θ) = qd(θ) > 0 implies qd(θ) < qˆ(θ). Differ-
entiating Λd over the separate regions of q, we have
Λq(q, θ) =

uq(q, q∗(q, θ), θ)− C ′(q)−
1−F (θ)
f(θ) uqθ(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ)
(
1 + ∂q
∗
∂q (q, θ)
)
, if q < qˆ(θ);
uq(q, 0, θ)− C ′(q)− 1−F (θ)f(θ) uqθ(q, 0, θ), if q > qˆ(θ).
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Taking limits as before,
lim
q↑qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ) = uq(qˆ(θ), 0, θ)− C ′(qˆ(θ))−
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(qˆ(θ), 0, θ)
(
1 +
∂q∗
∂q
(qˆ(θ)−, θ)
)
,
lim
q↓qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ) = uq(qˆ(θ), 0, θ)− C ′(qˆ(θ))−
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(qˆ(θ), 0, θ).
Because the goods are substitutes ∂q
∗
∂q (qˆ(θ)
−, θ) < 0, implying
lim
q↑qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ) > lim
q↓qˆ(θ)
Λdq(q, θ).
!
Proof of Proposition 5: We begin by guessing that a symmetric equilibrium allocation
can be found which is linear in θ as in the case of monopoly and the first-best.29 With
this conjecture, it follows that the equilibrium tariffs are quadratic and of the form
P (q) =
{
a0 + a1q + a22 q
2 if q ≤ qfb(θ¯)
P (qfb(θ¯)) + c(q − qfb(θ¯)) otherwise.
Note that over the relevant range, P is quadratic and at q = qfb(θ¯), P is extended in a
linear and smooth fashion so as to remain above cq; this particular extension is convenient
but could take other forms.
Lemma 1 implies that such a schedule must also satisfy right-continuity at the origin,
so a0 = 0. We proceed by assuming the equilibrium regular with tariff parameters a1
and a2, and then check ex post that the candidate equilibrium is indeed regular. In
our quadratic-uniform model, a symmetric equilibrium qd must solve at any θ such that
qd(θ) > 0, Λq(qd(θ), θ) = 0, which implies
α+ θ − qd(θ)− c(β − γ) = (θ¯ − θ)
(
1 +
∂q∗
∂q
(qd(θ), θ)
)
.
Because P (q) = a1q + a22 q
2 on the relevant range of equilibrium outputs, in a symmetric
equilibrium and q∗(q, θ) is constrained to be nonnegative, we obtain
q∗(q, θ) = max
{
0,
−γq + (β + γ)θ + (β + γ)(α− a1(β − γ)
β + a2(β2 − γ2)
}
, (13)
and for q∗(qd(θ), θ) = qd(θ) > 0,
∂q∗(qd(θ), θ)
∂q
= − γ
β + a2(β2 − γ2) . (14)
29We know from Martimort (1992) and Stole (1991) that, in the case of complements, other equilibria can
be found that are not linear. Because our findings are expressed with only the assumption of regularity, they
apply equally well to all those other less tractable equilibria.
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Substituting and collecting terms yields
qd(θ) = qfb(θ¯)− (θ¯ − θ)
(
1 + (β − γ)
(
1 + (β + γ)a2
β + (β2 − γ2)a2
))
. (15)
Given P (q) = a1q + a22 q
2, the agent’s first-order condition, uq(q, q, θ)− P ′(q) = 0 can be
rewritten as
qd(θ) =
α+ θ − a1(β − γ)
1 + a2(β − γ) . (16)
Identifying (15) and (16), the coefficient a2 must solve:
2(β2 − γ2)a22 + 3βa2 + 1 = 0
which has two real roots. In the text, it was established that, if vd(q, θ) has strict increasing
differences in equilibrium, then
1 +
∂q∗
∂q
(qd(θ), θ) > 0. (17)
Using (14) one can check that one root always violates (17) while the other always satisfies
it. The acceptable root is defined by
a2 = − 2
3β +
√
β2 + 8γ2
< 0.
In addition, (15) and (16) also imply that qd(θ¯) = qfb(θ¯), which provides a second identi-
fying restriction. Substituting our result for a2, we have
a1 = c+
2qfb(θ¯)
3β +
√
β2 + 8γ2
> c.
Returning to (15), we can substitute in the equilibrium values for a2 and simplify to obtain
the formula for the equilibrium consumption in the text.
We now establish regularity at this solution. First, note that vd(q, θ) is continuous
because it is a maximum value function. Note that vdθ (q, θ) is continuous because q
∗(q, θ)
is continuous. To establish that vd has strict increasing differences, we need only establish
that vdqθ(q, θ) > 0 at all points of differentiability.
vdqθ(q, θ) = uq1θ(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ) + uq2θ(q, q
∗(q, θ), θ)
∂q∗(q, θ)
∂q
=
1
β − γ
(
1 +
∂q∗(q, θ)
∂q
)
.
This expression is possibly discontinuous, but strictly positive given our solution for a2.
Because vd(q, θ) has strict increasing differences, it follows that vd is increasing in θ.
Hence, vd satisfies the requisite regularity conditions.
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Next consider the virtual surplus function, Λd(q, θ), that vd(q, θ) generates. Inserting
(14) into the expression above for vdqθ, we observe that v
d
qθ(q, θ) is independent of θ and,
since the distribution of θ is uniform, it follows that Λd(q, θ) inherits the increasing differ-
ences in (q, θ) property from vd(q, θ). Given that P (q) is quadratic on the relevant range
of outputs, it follows that Λd(q, θ) is quadratic in q over the region where q∗(q, θ) > 0. The
solution for a2 further guarantees that Λd(q, θ) is strictly concave over this region. Over
the region of the domain for which q∗(q, θ) = 0, Λd(q, θ) is also quadratic and strictly
concave. Thus, we need only to establish that on the boundary of these two regions,
Λd(q, θ) has only an inward (i.e., concave-preserving) kink. But this is true given Lemma
2. Hence, Λd(q, θ) is strictly concave (and hence strictly quasi-concave), which establishes
regularity for the symmetric equilibrium. !
Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose to the contrary that θi0 < θm0 . If θi0 < θm0 , then
qi(θ) > 0, qm(θ) = 0 and Λm(qm(θ), θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θi0, θm0 ). It follows also that over
this interval of types
0 = Λm(qm(θ), θ) > Λm(qi(θ), θ)
= u(qi(θ), qi(θ), θ)− 2C(qi(θ))− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uθ(qi(θ), qi(θ), θ)
= Λi(qi(θ), θ) + P i(qi(θ))− C(qi(θ))
≥ Λi(qi(θ), θ). (18)
The first inequality follows from qm(θ) being the unique maximizer of Λm(q, θ) in tandem
with the fact that qi(θ) "= qm(θ) over this interval. The middle substitution follows from
the definition of vi(q, θ); note that this step is invalid in the case of delegation. The
last inequality above follows from the fact that the firms earn nonnegative profit for each
served consumer type in the intrinsic agency game.30 Because J i(θ) = Λi(qi(θ), θ) < 0 for
all θ ∈ (θi0, θm0 ), it cannot be that θi0 is the optimal participation cutoff. A contradiction.
Suppose in addition that P (q) is differentiable in the neighborhood of 0. If θi0 = θm0 =
θ0 and qi(θ0) "= qm(θ0) = 0, then a similar contradiction emerges. Thus, if θi0 = θm0 = θ0,
it must be that qi(θ0) = qm(θ0) = 0, which implies qi(θ) is continuous. In that case, it
must also be that 0 = Λmq (qm(θ0), θ0) = Λmq (qi(θ0), θ0). Using the following identity (valid
30Using an argument from Jullien (2000, Lemma 3), if profits were negative for the marginal consumer, a
firm could offer a new price schedule of P˜ (q) = max{P (q), C(q)} and improve profits, yielding a contradiction.
Moreover, in any symmetric equilibrium, the last inequality is also strict at θi0 if qi(θi0) > 0.
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at any qi(θ) > 0)
Λiq(q
i(θ), θ) =
1
2
Λmq (q
i(θ), θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uqθ(qi(θ), qi(θ), θ)
∂q∗(qi(θ), θ)
∂q
and passing to the limit as θ converges towards θ0 yields
1− F (θ0)
f(θ0)
uqθ(0, 0, θ0)
∂q∗(0+, θ0)
∂q
= 0
which cannot arise since qm(θ0) = 0 implies θ0 "= θ¯ and ∂q
∗(0+,θ0)
∂q "= 0 when either goods
are substitutes or complements and P i(q) is differentiable on the interior of its domain
(using the same reasoning as in the Proof of Proposition 4). !
Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose that P i(q) = P d(q) + P0 for some P0 to be found
below. Let vd(q, θ) be the regular indirect utility function in the delegated game. Then
the associated indirect utility function in the intrinsic game is
vi(q, θ) = vd(q, θ)− P0 +
(
max
q2∈Q
u(0, q2, θ)− P d(q2)
)
,
where the parentheses contain the hypothetical return to a consumer who could exclusively
contract with the rival firm and pay P d(q). Using a more compact notation, we have
simply
vi(q, θ) = vd(q, θ)− P0 + φd(θ),
where φd(θ) ≥ 0 = u(0, 0, θ) − P d(0) and φd(θ) is nondecreasing in θ since φ˙d(θ) =
uθ(0, q∗(0, θ), θ) ≥ 0. Hence, if vd is increasing in θ and has strict increasing differences
in (q, θ), then so is vi.
Now consider the intrinsic virtual surplus function:
Λi(q, θ) = vd(q, θ)− P0 + φd(θ)− C(q)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(
vdθ (q, θ) + φ˙
d(θ)
)
= Λd(q, θ)− P0 +
(
φd(θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
φ˙d(θ)
)
= Λd(q, θ)− P0 + Φ(θ),
where Φ(θ) has been defined as the bracketed term of the second line. Notice that Λi(q, θ)
inherits increasing differences and strict quasi-concavity from Λd(q, θ).
It follows that if qd(θ) ∈ argmaxq∈Q Λd(q, θ), then qd(θ) ∈ argmaxq∈Q Λi(q, θ) for all
θ ∈ [θi0, θ¯]. This implies that the marginal price schedules are identical in each game so
that P d(q) = P i(q) + P0. It remains to verify that P0 > 0 in a symmetric equilibrium.
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To do so, we may first rewrite Λi(qi(θ), θ) as
Λi(qi(θ), θ) = u(qi(θ), q∗(qi(θ), θ), θ)− P0 − P d(q∗(qi(θ), θ))
− C(qi(θ))− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
u(qi(θ), q∗(qi(θ), θ), θ)
and using the condition of a symmetric equilibrium that q∗(qi(θ), θ) = qi(θ),
Λi(qi(θ), θ) = u(qi(θ), qi(θ), θ)− P0 − P d(qi(θ))− C(qi(θ))
− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
uθ(qi(θ), qi(θ), θ).
Define the value function under intrinsic agency as J i(θ) = Λi(qi(θ), θ) which is im-
plicitly a function of P0 (we slightly abuse notations here because the true value func-
tion would be max{0,Λi(qi(θ), θ)} to take into account the option of non-participation).
We want to find a fixed-point solution (θi0, P0) such that J i(θi0) = 0 given P0 (with a
second-order condition of the firm’s problem requiring that J i(θi0) is nondecreasing) and
2P0 + 2P d(qd(θi0)) = u(qi(θi0), qi(θi0), θi0) given θi0. Hence, we must find a solution to the
equation:
u(qi(θi0), q
i(θi0), θ
i
0)− 2C(qi(θi0))− 2
1− F (θi0)
f(θi0)
uθ(qi(θi0), q
i(θi0), θ
i
0) = 0. (19)
A first candidate is the pair (θi0 = θd0 , P0 = 0) corresponding to the delegated agency
solution. For such a pair, we have J i(θd0) = 0 and 2P0 = u(qd(θd0), qd(θd0), θi0) = 0. We
will show that J i is strictly decreasing to the right of θd0 , therefore ruling out θi0 = θd0 as
a possibility. To this end, note that J i(θ) = 0 for all θ ≤ θd0 , so it is nondecreasing to the
left. Using our identity that Λi(q, θ) = Λd(q, θ)− P0 +Φ(θ), consider the right derivative
of J i:
J˙ i(θ) =
∂Λd(qd(θ), θ)
∂q
q˙d(θ) +
∂Λd(qd(θ), θ)
∂θ
+ Φ˙(θ).
By the envelope theorem, the first term is zero. Because qd(θ) is continuous at θd0 and
qi(θd0) = qd(θd0) = 0, it follows that viθ(0, θ
d
0) = viθθ(0, θ
d
0) = 0, implying that the second
term is also zero at θd0 . Expanding the third term, we have
Φ˙(θ) = φ˙d(θ)
(
1− d
dθ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
−
(
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)(
uθθ(qd(θ), qd(θ), θ) + uθq(qd(θ), qd(θ), θ)
∂q∗(qd(θ), θ)
∂θ
)
.
Again, because qi(θd0) = 0, it follows that φ˙d(θd0) = 0 and uθθ(0, 0, θd0) = 0. We are left
with the following expression for the right derivative of J i at θd0 :
J˙ i(θ) = −
(
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)(
uθq(qd(θ), qd(θ), θ)
∂q∗(qd(θ), θ)
∂θ
)
< 0,
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which is decidedly negative. Hence, (θi0 = θd0 , P0 = 0) is not an acceptable solution.
Note that the previous argument establishes that J i(θd0 + ε) < 0 for sufficiently
small ε > 0. At θ¯ we know J i(θ¯) > 0 because u(qfb(θ¯), qfb(θ¯), θ¯)) − 2C(qfb(θ¯)) =
W fb(qfb(θ¯), θ¯) > 0 by assumption. By continuity of J i and the mean value theorem, there
exists such θi0 ∈ (θd0 , θ¯) such that J i is nondecreasing and 2P0 = u(qi(θi0), qi(θi0), θi0) > 0. !
Proof of Proposition 8: Proposition 7 implies qi(θ) = qd(θ) for all θ ∈ [θi0, θ¯] and
qi(θ) = 0 otherwise. Proposition 7 also implies that the intrinsic equilibrium is regular
whenever the associated delegated equilibrium is regular. Proposition 5 establishes that
the equilibrium under delegation and quadratic-uniform preferences is regular. The ex-
plicit calculations for the quadratic-uniform are thus the same as in Proposition 5. What
remains is the calculation of θi0.
As observed in the proof to Proposition 7, the proposed solution of θi0 = θd0 is un-
acceptable because J i is decreasing is to the right of θd0 . In the specific context of the
quadratic-uniform model, (19) can be restated as
qi(θi0)
(
qi(θi0)
2
+ (θ¯ − θi0)
(
∂q∗
∂q
(qi(θ), θ)− 1
))
= 0 (20)
where ∂q
∗
∂q (q
i(θ), θ) is given by (14). This quadratic equation has two roots
qi(θi0) = 0 and q
i(θi0) = 2(θ¯ − θi0)
(
1 +
γ
β + a2(β2 − γ2)
)
> 0,
with the acceptable solution is the positive root above. !
Proof of Theorem 1: The relationships in equations (9)-(12) follow from the results in
Propositions 2, 4 and 6. That a regular, symmetric equilibrium exists in the quadratic-
uniform model follows from Propositions 3, 5 and 8. !
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